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The article inquires into the conditions of effective leadership of states in international politics, 
and develops a framework for the study of so-called (new) regional powers such as Brazil, 
China, India, and South Africa in processes of regional institution-building. Various 
theoretical strands will be discussed as to the requirements of effective leadership in 
international affairs. Most importantly, the relationship between power, leadership and 
hegemony will be outlined. It is argued that the connection between leadership and hegemony 
is one of co-constitution. Leadership is necessarily based on hegemony, while hegemony can 
only be sustained through leadership. Furthermore, it will be shown that both leadership and 
hegemony are essentially political in character, whereas power has no such insinuation but 
has to be translated into leadership and hegemony through discursive means. Finally, the 
analysis asks for the preconditions of leadership in East Asia, using China’s and Japan’s roles 
in East Asian regionalism as an illustration. 
 





Leadership of states in processes of regional institutionalization is a significant though still 
widely ignored topic in the field of International Relations (IR). While some prominent works 
look at formal leadership from a rational institutionalist perspective (e.g., Underdal 1994, 
Sjostedt 1999; Tallberg 2006), this study asks for the broader conditions of effective 
leadership of states in international politics. In other words: it takes one step back by asking 
how leaders become leaders and what they actually do when they perform the role of a leader 
in international politics. As a first step, different theoretical strands will be presented as to the 
requirements of effective leadership in international affairs. Referring to Steven Lukes’ 
(1974) three-dimensional view of power, it will be argued that leadership is effective and 
sustainable when foreign elites acknowledge the leader’s vision of international order and 
internalise it as their own. It is often disputed and is constituted by shared ideas about self, 
other, and the world, relying on the intersubjective internalisation of ideas, norms, and 
identities. It will, however, be necessary to add another power dimension in the course of the 
paper, which will be summarized under the concept of (discursive) hegemony. 
 
To exemplify the usefulness of the developed framework for the study of (new) regional 
powers such as Brazil, China, India, or South Africa, the analysis inquires as to the 
prerequisites of effective leadership in international institution-building in East Asia, using 
China’s and Japan’s roles in East Asian regionalism as an illustration. It should be noted at the 
outset that the kind of argument developed in this paper is in need of substantial theoretical 
elaboration, since leadership theory in IR still lacks a coherent approach. The bulk of what 
follows is thus theoretical in nature. Taking Lukes’ insights into the concept of power as a 
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starting point, a process- and meaning-based theory of leadership will be developed. Two 
intellectual sources are of primary relevance in this context: Firstly, new theories of 
leadership developed in political theory, management studies, and psychology will be 
employed to outline a general concept of leadership that seeks to differentiate between power 
and leadership. In that context, it will be emphasised that ‘to lead’ is not a fixed state of being 
but rather an act that has to be unveiled by looking at political processes. It will thus be taken 
as what it is in the first instance: a verb. This perspective seems necessary as traditional 
accounts of IR theory, such as various versions of rationalism, centre on the distribution of 
material capabilities, while constructivist and poststructuralist approaches in IR have only 
recently started to approach process-related concepts such as power and hegemony in 
international politics (e.g., Nabers 2009; Joseph 2003). Secondly, insights about how a leader 
becomes a leader will be delineated, or – to use the term most aptly developed by Ernesto 
Laclau and his numerous followers in the Essex School of Discourse Theory – how a 
hegemonic discourse develops and what role a ‘leader’ can play in the process. The 
relationship between leadership and hegemony as it is conceptualised here is one of co-
constitution. Leadership is necessarily based on hegemony, while hegemony can only be 
sustained through leadership. It will be shown that both leadership and hegemony are 
essentially political in character, whereas power has no such implication but has to be 
translated into leadership and hegemony through discursive means. After delineating the three 
relevant concepts and their interrelatedness in the next section, an integrated model of power, 
leadership, and hegemony will be developed. Sino-Japanese antagonism and the two 
countries’ quest for leadership in regional institution-building serves to exemplify the 
argument. The conclusion will summarizeise the most important implications for research on 
regional powers institutionalization. 
 
 
2 Power, leadership and hegemony 
 
2.1 Lukes’ concept of power as a starting point 
 
Steven Lukes’ (2005 [1974]) famous definition of the term power provides us with a helpful 
starting point in thinking about leadership. Lukes argues that power is most effective in its 
unobservable form, that is, when willing compliance to the powerful is secured by means of 
influencing others ‘perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things’ (Lukes 2005 [1974]: 11). Summing up Lukes’ 
argument, power has to be understood as having three interrelated dimensions: First, referring 
to Robert Dahl’s (1957) classic definition, power is exercised if A can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do. Lukes points to the conceptual difference between the mere 
capacity of possessing power and the actual exercise of power. In a later methodological step, 
Dahl asked which actors had eventually been able to initiate alternatives that were adopted, or 
had been able to veto proposals (Dahl 1961), building a bridge towards what Lukes calls a 
two-dimensional view of power. This dimension looks at the de facto power of the members 
within a group in the decision-making process: ‘it incorporates into the analysis of power 
relations the question of the control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in which 
potential issues are kept out of the political process’ (Lukes 2005 [1974]: 25). Lukes 
maintains that the rules within any decision-making system naturally bias the mobilization of 
resources for competition in agenda formation against some individuals and groups and in 
favour of others. This dimension of power therefore incorporates coercion, influence, 
authority, force, and manipulation; it is restricted to concrete observable behaviour in a 
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political decision-making process, which is why Lukes goes a step further by developing a 
three-dimensional view of power. According to this perspective, an actor exercises power 
over another by influencing, shaping, or determining his wants, beliefs, and understandings 
about the world. Subtle forms of power, such as the control of information and the process of 
socialization, fall into this category. 
 
This is an essentially social view of power, which may involve thought control and the 
indoctrination of people’s wants. Although Lukes maintains that this view provides a deeper 
and more suitable explanation of power relations than the first two, rationalist approaches to 
international politics, such as institutionalism and liberalism, widely ignore this relational and 
processual perspective on power, due to their statist ontology (Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986). As 
Lukes (2005 [1974]: 12) has maintained, power does not necessarily have to be exercised. As 
a capacity, it can be turned into leadership, hegemony, or domination,1 but this is not a 
conditio sine qua non. Power does not equal leadership. 
 
Surprisingly, the early strands of IR theorizing largely relied on a capacity-based power 
definition. For instance, Kenneth Waltz conceptualizeised power as a ‘means’ and contended 
that ‘the outcome of its use is necessarily uncertain’ (Waltz 1979: 192). He thus restricted 
himself to measuring power in terms of the distribution of capabilities and was not interested 
in process and interaction. Many of Waltz’s realist predecessors and theoretical companions 
fell within the broad compass of statist balance-of-power arguments. Examples are George 
Liska, who suggested that ‘alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or 
something’ (Liska 1962: 12) and Hans J. Morgenthau, who depicted international cooperation 
as ‘a necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multiple state system’ 
(Morgenthau 1967: 175). For those traditional realists, international institutions were always a 
function of materially defined state power and interests (Carr 1964; 170-171). Similarly, 
contemporary realist thinkers like John Mearsheimer focus on the material power levels of 
individual states, from which they derive the architecture of the international system 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 12). 
 
Interestingly, neoinstitutionalist accounts aimed to adopt categories that exceeded the 
materialist scope (Keohane 1984, 1989; Krasner 1983), incorporating ideas and identities 
instead. That is perhaps why Robert Keohane suggested in After Hegemony that  
 
[a]ny act of cooperation or apparent cooperation needs to be interpreted within the context of related 
actions, and of prevailing expectations and shared beliefs, before its meaning can be properly 
understood. Fragments of political behavior become comprehensible when viewed as part of a larger 
mosaic. (Keohane 1984: 56) 
 
It is not absolutely clear what Keohane meant by this suggestion. Referring to peoples’ values 
and their willingness to promote widely accepted norms, the theory obviously adopts 
variables that lie outside the realm of the traditional institutionalist paradigm, which is 
rational-utilitarian and strictly materialist in nature. However, in the last two decades many 
supposedly realist or neoinstitutionalist accounts have already transcended this narrow 
perspective. Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie’s landmark article on international 
institutions and organizations set the tone. Kratochwil and Ruggie unveiled a deep tension 
between idealist ontology and positivist epistemology, and argued for a new approach ‘that 
would open up regime analysis to the communicative rather than merely the referential 
functions of norms in social interactions’ (Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986: 774). More recent 
examples of novel perspectives on international institutions include Peter M. and Ernst B. 
                                                 
1 It should be noted at this point that domination is not the central concern of this paper. 
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Haas, who argue from a pragmatic constructivist standpoint that international institutions 
might indeed be ‘wilful actors on their own, but are also the venue in which reflexive new 
practices and policies develop’ (Haas/Haas 2002: 573). Finally, Thomas Gehring and Eva 
Ruffing’s work on the power of reasoned arguments versus parochial interests should be 
noted as only one example on how to surmount static power conceptions (Gehring/Ruffing 
2008). 
 
But realist thinking has also developed into meaning- and process-based accounts. For 
example, Stephen Walt assumes that power alone cannot explain the balancing behaviour of 
states. Instead he proposes the concept of ‘balance of threat’ as a better alternative than 
‘balance of power’, and argues that the level of threat against any state is affected by 
geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and the perceived intentions of adversary states 
(Walt 1987: 5; see also Walt 1997). For example, the immediate threat that the offensive 
capabilities of states like North Korea or Iran pose for surrounding states may create a strong 
incentive for those states to balance against the threat. Even a state with a deteriorating 
economy and a military in disarray may prompt others to balance against it if it is perceived as 
especially aggressive (Walt 1987: 25-26). 
 
What is striking about all these accounts is, on the one hand, a hesitancy to delve into the 
complexities of Lukes’ three-dimensional view and, on the other hand, a widespread 
ignorance with regard to the link between power and leadership. Michael Williams (2005) 
therefore demands a return to the anthropological foundations of realism and a focus on the 
constructive relational processes of Self and Other (for a comment, Jütersonke 2006: 464; also 
Wong 2000). His work is an intriguing deconstruction of – in his view – false dichotomies 
between classical realism and critical and poststructuralist thought. It is, however, 
questionable whether the proposition of such a kind of richer realism does not put the whole 
realist project into question, or – as Stefano Guzzini (2001) has shown – whether defining the 
core of realism does not mean abandoning a lot of what IR has to say today. 
 
Writing about bargaining power in multilateral negotiations, for example, Gerald Schneider 
complains that ‘[it] is, moreover, nearly impossible to obtain indicators that sufficiently 
approximate the demanding concepts advocated by social constructivism and related 
approaches’ (Schneider 2005: 681). Sheer brute power has not only been more fascinating for 
IR theorists than complex social relationships, it has also been easier to handle conceptually. 
As Lukes’ definition exceeds even most constructivist approaches in terms of complexity, its 
manifold methodological implications might hinder many scholars from transcending 
traditional IR rationalism. In essence, Lukes’ work is a forceful critique of methodological 
individualism and behaviourism. In the following, it will thus be maintained, contrary to the 
rationalist position, that successful leadership in international affairs must take Lukes’ three-
dimensional view of power into consideration and develop it further. Power has to be 
internalizeised in the intersubjective understandings of relevant actors. Ultimately, this is the 
basis of what will later in this article be called a hegemonic project. 
 
 
2.2 Power and leadership 
 
Having delineated the most obvious shortcomings of the static, rationalist, and solely 
materialist approaches to power, a second question to be addressed here refers to the 
conceptual distinction between power and leadership. What is it that differentiates leadership 
from power? Why does one leader lead and not another? What material capabilities does one 
need to become a leader? What characterises the relationship between leaders and followers? 
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Again, I argue henceforth that in order to understand leadership, we have to take a closer look 
at the process- and meaning-driven character of international politics. In various traditional 
strands of IR theory, collective interest is assumed to be pre-given and hence exogenous to 
social interaction (see the critique in Wendt 1994: 389; Ruggie 1998: 118-119). In contrast, I 
will argue that social interaction does ultimately have transformative effects on interests and 
identity, because continuous cooperation is likely to influence intersubjective meanings. 
 
To date, James MacGregor Burns’ definition of the concept of leadership is still the most 
sophisticated and functional, as it puts the complex relationship between leaders and 
followers at centre stage. It involves persuasion, exchange, and transformation. It is a form of 
power, but it implies mutuality. To quote Burns: 
 
Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, 
in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as 
to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to realize goals mutually 
held by both leaders and followers. (Burns 1978: 18; emphasis in original) 
 
What is significant in this definition is that leadership is competitive; potential leaders have to 
appeal to the motives of potential followers. It must hence be distinguished from domination 
and coercion. As I will make clear further on in this article, ideas and motives are not carved 
in stone. Leaders might be able to get potential followers to see the world through their eyes. 
In contrast to mere power holders, leaders are effective because they induce change. 
Leadership, again in contrast to brute power, is inseparable from the wants and needs of 
followers, but these wants and needs may be changed through social interaction. 
 
Leadership approaches must thus embed the concepts of leaders and followers within a 
broader theory of social and political processes, develop a model of social change, account for 
the physical constraints of social interaction, and recognise the difficult interplay between 
morality and power. It is helpful to look at how leadership is conceptualised in other 
disciplines, most notably political theory, psychology, and management. Several dimensions 
which make it possible to link leadership with traditional concepts of power can be extracted 
from the literature in these fields (especially Burns 1978; also Keohane 2005, Schirm 2009; 
Samuels 2003 and Young 1991): 
 
1. While power can be an intrinsic quality that cannot always be explained by the 
interactions between the powerful and the less powerful, leadership must essentially be 
conceptualised as an activity. Power does not necessarily entail leadership, nor does power 
always help to achieve the desired outcomes, as Christopher Layne elucidates quite 
appositely with regard to the United States: ‘There is a paradox between the magnitude of 
American power and Washington’s inability to use that power to always get what it wants 
in international politics […] hegemony is not omnipotence’ (Layne 2006: 41-42). Leaders 
have to make decisions, gather resources, use incentives and threats, formulate visions, 
and build coalitions. As Nannerl Keohane puts it: ‘Judgment is needed to identify issues 
and priorities, know how to allocate time and energy, make decisions, choose and recruit 
the people best qualified to be lieutenants and collaborators, and see how to use their 
skills’ (Keohane 2005: 710). Leadership necessitates foresight and information-gathering 
skills, which might be called a form of power, but surely transcends traditional accounts. 
 
2. Leadership requires an institutionalised context. It is seldom ad hoc. On the contrary, it 
rests on continuity, stability, and repetition. This continual asymmetry between leaders 
and followers is what one could also call power. Leaders must therefore pay attention to 
different institutionalised contexts at the same time, be it at the bilateral, regional, or 
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global level. Institutionalisation often means that leadership is issue specific, and different 
forms of power and leadership are required in different situations.  
 
3. From this follows that leaders act under constraints when they use their power; they are 
not entirely free to choose their options, for their actions are shaped by followers and by 
circumstances to a changing degree. 2  As Burns emphasises in his groundbreaking 
monograph, leadership is always relational (Burns 1978: chapter 1): leaders must speak 
and be able to listen at the same time, and show empathy. Writing on Presidential Power 
in the U.S., Richard Neustadt argues that ‘real power is reciprocal and varies markedly 
with organization, subject matter, personality and situation’ (Neustadt 1980: 32). 
Followers must be assured that they can count on the leader in a difficult situation, such as 
a military attack. As has been the case for the United States on many occasions in the past, 
a leader must be willing to stand up for its principles, to show courage and integrity. But 
he must also admit mistakes and show that he has learned from them. This dimension of 
leadership relates power to legitimacy (e.g. Hurrell 2007: 78-79). Leaders are coalition-
builders; they rarely act alone. Subordinates are enlisted to fulfil certain roles in the 
leadership game; tasks are delegated. 
 
4. Finally, leadership has a normative dimension. It plays an imperative role in tackling 
internationally relevant problems such as terrorism, trade facilitation, climate change, 
humanitarian aid, and institutional cooperation in general. Strong leadership seems to be 
essential for guiding and directing a group of countries towards collective action. 
Effective leadership is crucial in this process, since it serves various functions in the 
negotiation process. Moreover, leadership theory suggests that decentralised bargaining is 
subject to collective-action problems. This will lead members of an international 
institution to delegate functions of agenda management, brokerage, and mediation to more 
powerful countries. Leaders might have the capacity to solve collective-action problems 
that might otherwise paralyse decentralised negotiations. The delegation of powers to 
leading countries can be seen as a functional response by states to collective-action 
problems in multilateral negotiations. Strong leaders often wield asymmetrical control 
over preference formation and negotiation procedure. Opportunistic leaders will use this 
privilege for both collective and private gain, promoting an agreement that is closest to 
their own preferred position (Tallberg 2006). 
 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations constitute the key method by which states address joint 
problems and develop standard behavioural norms in world politics. In multilateral 
negotiations, the more universal the character of an issue is, and the greater the number of the 
participating states tends to be, the more important effectual leadership is in order to make the 
debate move forward toward an accord. This is because the bigger the number of nation states 
which join the negotiations, the more diverse the issues which are regarded as national 
interests by each country, and the more complicated the relationship between those various 
interests. The presence of leadership is a necessary condition for reaching an agreement 
(Young 1991: 302). In other words, as Lindberg and Scheingold argued, ‘leadership is the 
very essence of a capacity for collective action’ in multilateral negotiations (Lindberg and 
                                                 
2 For that reason, Richard Samuels (2003: 6) has referred to leadership as ‘that constrained place where 
imagination, resources and opportunity converge. The imaginings need not be original to the leader, but 
he is the one who can control their use for his ends. The resources need not be entirely of her making, 
but she must be able to commandeer them for her own use. Opportunities will flow past individual 
entrepreneurs from time to time, and the successful leader will seize them. Most important of all, the 
constraints need not be determinant, and the change need not be serendipitous. Determined individuals 
will demonstrate a range of creative ways to combine resources and ideas and to seize opportunity’. 
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Sheingold 1970: 128). Likewise, Underdal contends that the more multifaceted the 
negotiation setting – that is, the larger the number of the actors and the number and ‘intricacy’ 
of issues – the more likely it is that some actors will emerge as leaders and others as followers. 
In this process, critical leadership becomes a determinant of success (Underdal 1994: 179-
180). 
 
Several authors in IR theory have thus tried to develop a more comprehensive, interactive 
model of leadership and power in the last two decades. Young has explored the concept of 
leadership from a behavioural perspective, differentiating between three forms of leadership – 
structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual leadership – proposing a way 
to understand leadership in international bargaining that can be of great help when analysing 
states as leaders in international affairs. Young’s contribution with regard to the role of 
leadership in international politics is considerable. He makes three basic arguments: Firstly, 
leadership is essentially relational; structural leadership aims to translate relative power 
capabilities into bargaining leverage by making use of material threats and promises. Forming 
effective coalitions can be crucial in this process. Secondly, a leader will be able to act as an 
agenda setter, showing innovative solutions to overcome deadlocks or operating as a broker to 
gain support for salient solutions. Thirdly, leadership is a reflective process, necessitating a 
deliberative process of exchanging arguments. It implies the ‘power of ideas to shape the 
intellectual capital available to those engaged in institutional bargaining’ (Young 1991: 300). 
 
This corresponds to Susan Strange’s distinction between ‘structural power’ and ‘relational 
power’. While the latter refers to the ability of one state to influence another state’s behaviour 
directly, she maintains that structural power denotes one state’s ability to indirectly influence 
others by delineating the structures within which they must operate (Strange 1983). In a 
similar vein, Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that 
 
 there is also a more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive 
beliefs rather than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary 
nations. Elites in secondary states buy into and internalise norms that are articulated by the hegemon and 
therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon’s notion of international order. (Ikenberry/Kupchan 
1990: 283)  
 
This is a statement that gets much closer to reality than the static assumptions presented by 
materialist approaches to power. It refers to the mechanisms that make leadership possible, to 
the sustainability of compliance by secondary states, and to the likelihood of leadership 
failure. To accommodate exogenous sources of leadership in the model developed here, one 
has to ask how material sources are turned into leadership in international negotiations, since 
it is assumed that the material power base has no intrinsic significance in itself. This is not to 
say that material incentives do not play a role in international politics; it is rather to address 
the question of how material capabilities are represented as meaningful in international 
politics. 
 
Following Ikenberry and Kupchan, there are two basic ways to exercise leadership. The first 
refers to material incentives, ranging from economic sanctions and military strikes on the 
negative end to promises of reward on the positive end. These methods aim to change the 
costs and benefits of potential followers in pursuing alternative policies, and still operate with 
rationalist presumptions. The second means of exercising leadership relies on the 
modification of the basic beliefs of leaders in other nations (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 
285). These two ways of exercising leadership are interrelated and reinforce each other in the 
political process. In reality, coercion and persuasion take place at the same time. As has been 
said before, the first method works through external inducement (Ikenberry and Kupchan 
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1990: 290), relying on economic and military incentives to induce followers to change their 
policies. The second is much more complex and has to be treated in more detail. It implies a 
reflexive, discourse-based conception of power, allowing for a complex reformulation of 
interests and identities. 
 
Yet, where all the approaches discussed so far stop, and where this article proceeds, is how to 
engage potentials followers in the debating and contesting of ideas and meanings. In an 
intriguing analytical step, Burns distinguished transactional from transformational leadership. 
While ‘leaders approach followers with an eye to exchanging one thing for another’ (Burns 
1978: 4) in the former case – one example being military protection in exchange for the 
provision of land use, as with Germany’s and Japan’s relations with the United States after 
World War II (Nabers 2000; Berger 1998) – the follower is more fully engaged in the latter 
case: ‘The result of transforming leadership is a relationship of mutual simulation and 
elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents’ 
(ibid.). As we will see, it is in this kind of elevation of followers into leaders that the 
theoretical strands of leadership theory and Lukes’ three-dimensional view of power converge. 
Leadership is always contested by challenges from those who are left out of what we will call 
a ‘hegemonic project’, and sometimes from those who find themselves in a subordinate 
position to the leader. The central question of the next section refers to the strategies that 
actors employ to present their particular visions as universal, so that they become acceptable 
to relevant others. As will be outlined, this understanding of power transcends the three-




2.3 Leadership as discursive hegemony 
 
Crucial for a process- and meaning-based understanding of leadership and a fully defined 
understanding of power is the concept of hegemony as developed in modern political theory – 
not to be conflated with the concept of hegemony put forward by hegemonic stability theory 
in the field of IR. 3  While Steven Lukes relies heavily on Antonio Gramsci’s work on 
hegemony to develop his three-dimensional view of power (e.g., Lukes 2005 [1974]: 7-8, 49-
50, 144-145, 152), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe – in their seminal work Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985) – reformulated Gramsci’s notion of hegemony in a way that takes 
discourse as constitutive for politics. Some observers see the book as the most outstanding 
example of the relationship between poststructuralism and political theory 
(Finlayson/Valentine 2002: 1). Laclau and Mouffe are at the forefront of those theorists in the 
poststructuralist vein who combine a theory of power with a strictly differential conception of 
identity. Laclau and Mouffe’s theory can thus be used as a foil for a process-based 
understanding of leadership. Although numerous interrelated concepts – such as discourse, 
hegemony, undecidability, difference and equivalence, emptiness and openness – are 
fundamental to Laclau and Mouffe’s work, only those aspects that are of direct import for a 
broader concept of leadership will be addressed here.  
 
To start, structure is defined as discourse; the social and culture are constituted entirely within 
discourse. Discourse is necessarily about change and is defined through articulation. This 
does not deny the argument that power may rely on certain material circumstances. However, 
whether atomic weapons are constructed as a threat or as a nuclear umbrella to protect a 
certain country depends upon the nature of the discourse in which they are embedded. 
                                                 
3 For a broad discussion of hegemonic stability theory see the classic critique by Susan Strange (1987). 
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Meanings are entirely constituted by discursive practices. In fact, it is possible to understand 
the material and social world by studying meanings. Material conditions of possibility such as 
the possession of state-of-the art weapons are of significance, but what matters for social 
relations is their meaning. Again, it has to be accentuated here that ‘we inevitably resort to 
discursively-constituted concepts to refer to the extra-discursive’ (Smith 1998: 88). 
Unquestionably, we have not ‘constructed our ideas of international terrorism, both before 
and after 11 September, out of thin air’ (Wight 2006: 161). But what ultimately matters for 
our analysis are the ideas produced by a specific discourse, not their material ‘source’. The 
focus on socially constructed meanings does not eliminate the question of why some 
meanings prevail over others, as Wight (2006: 161-162) criticises. If Wight refers to power, 
which is not obvious in his criticism, it should be clear that material power is a form of power 
that depends on intersubjectivity as well. Human beings, the ‘human subject’, ‘man’, and 
‘woman’ – the material conditions of possibility are constructed differently in different 
religious, ideological, or constitutional discourses. Any physical constraint has to be endowed 
with meaning by humans in order for one to be able to act on it. This underlines our previous 
argument that leadership must be understood in its cultural context and that it is based on the 
interpretation of issue-specific information. 
 
The question is which meaning is able to prevail in the end. The notion of hegemony rests on 
the assumption that any discourse tries to dominate the field of discursivity. Power and the 
ability of regional powers to transform their material capabilities into leadership will thus 
depend on an actor’s ability to present his own particular worldview as compatible with the 
communal aims. This works best in a situation of disintegration and indeterminacy in 
articulations of different identities (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 7, 13; Laclau 1977: 103; Laclau 
2005: 122), or in a situation of dislocation. While crisis is a constant political phenomenon, 
the same is true for societal dislocation. As Norval maintains, ‘if the structure is dislocated 
und thus incomplete, an intervention by a subject is needed to re-suture it’ (Norval 2004: 142). 
This is the logical basis of all leadership, and basically of all politics. Previous political logics 
are put into question by a crisis, while more and more actors have to open themselves up to 
innovative discourses, and hegemonic strategies can be successful. A crucial question, then, is 
what a political project has to look like to be successful. Why does one prospective regional 
country carry more weight than another in assuming the role of a leader? To answer this 
question, let us scrutinise the hegemonic process more closely. The transition from one 
dominant discourse to another is a highly complex venture, encompassing a fundamental 
reconstruction of existing subject positions. As an ideal type, it can be summed up as 
follows:4 
 
(1) At the beginning there is a crisis, visible through a disintegration of popular 
identifications with institutionalised subject positions and political imaginaries. This 
could either be an external catastrophe such as a major war; a grave financial or economic 
crisis; humanitarian catastrophe or terrorist assault; or merely a necessary political 
decision in ‘undecidable terrain’ that might weaken dominant discourses, that is, 
prevailing concepts of reality, opening up cultural borders.  
 
(2) Competing political forces will attempt to hegemonise the political space, that is, to 
exercise leadership in that situation. Alternative discourses start to compete in their 
interpretation of the crisis and their attempt to resolve the ‘lack’ triggered by the crisis. 
Empty signifiers like ‘Asia’, ‘justice’, ‘community’, and ‘order’ function as horizons, as a 
‘surface of inscription’ for a number of specific political articulations. 
                                                 
4 See also Smith 1998: 164-168. 
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(3) Sooner or later, one predominant interpretation will evolve – often visible in the 
strengthening of communal bonds – which institutes the framework that determines what 
action is appropriate, and what action is inappropriate, to end the predicament. This 
dominant interpretative frame is due to its linkages with residual institutions – (Laclau 
1990: 64; Norval 1996: 96). 
 
(4) In due course, these identifications will become more and more routinised. The discourse 
becomes what Laclau calls an imaginary: ‘not one among other objects but an absolute 
limit which structures a field of intelligibility and is thus the condition of possibility for 
the emergence of any object’ (Laclau 1990: 64). As it becomes an imaginary, the 
discourse will generate new kinds of political action along the lines of the dominant 
interpretative framework (cf. also Laclau 1977). Specific cultural forms such as norms, 
rules, (political) institutions, conventions, ideologies, customs, and laws are all influenced 
by this process. This is an exercise of power in its purest form, as it categorically excludes 
alternative institutional frameworks. 
 
It has to be emphasised that this is an ideal-type version of the hegemonic process. An 
‘international order’ is never fully constituted and hegemonic interventions are possible at any 
time. Hegemony-based leadership is issue specific, culturally embedded, historically 
contingent, and never to be understood as a once-and-for-all decision (Williams 2007: 119). 
To be sure, leadership requires some kind of hegemonic process. It has to be conceded, 
though, that the battle between discourses to become the leading interpretative structure also 
reveals the configuration of power relations in a given historical moment. It would be naïve to 
think that the material capabilities of regional powers do not play their part in a discourse. 
However, they do not pre-determine the path towards leadership. For example, Singapore – 
not Japan or China, as materialist IR research would probably suggest – took the lead in East 
Asia with regard to bi- and multilateral trade liberalization after the Asian Crisis. Power is 
uneven,5 not stable or static, but is rearticulated continuously (Smith 1998: 57; Butler 2000: 
14; Laclau 2005: 115). Logically, it is impossible to say which stance will prevail in the end. 
In the case of the European Union, it could be Germany’s as well as Luxemburg’s; in Asia, it 
could be Singapore’s as well as China’s. The political is structured in terms of the logic of 
contingency, which rejects the assumption that it is established according to general laws that 
hold true in any case. That is why Neta Crawford, by analysing the end of colonialism as one 
of the major changes in world politics over the past 500 years, advocates the view that 
arguments can impact on politics and determine the path to leadership at least as much as 
military or economic capabilities (Crawford 2002). It was certainly not in the interest of the 
leading colonial empires to end this era. Therefore, a distinction between an infinite set of 
logical possibilities and a limited set of historical opportunities seems appropriate to 
circumvent a voluntaristic view of society. As Laclau explicates, 
 
[T]he undecidability between the various movements that are possible […] does not mean that at any 
time everything that is logically possible becomes automatically an actual political possibility. There are 
inchoate possibilities which are going to be blocked, not because of any logical restriction, but as a 
result of the historical contexts in which the representative institutions operate (Laclau 1996). 
 
To make this clearer, we have to introduce Laclau’s notion of credibility. The ideal type of a 
hegemonic process presented above emphasises that one predominant interpretation will 
evolve due to its linkages with residual institutions. While leadership has to be based on 
                                                 
5 As Laclau (2000: 54) aptly put it, ‘A power which is total is no power at all’. Lukes (2001 [1974]) 
offers the classical formulation of this view. 
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certain political traditions that subjects identify with, this argument will lose weight with the 
extent of the crisis (Laclau 2000a: 82; see also Laclau 1990: 66). The more far-reaching the 
dislocation of a discourse is, the fewer principles will be still in place after the crisis. While 
colonialism worked on a historical ground that had been already set up for it and drew on 
established interpretative frameworks of a ‘leading race’, ‘subhuman beings’, xenophobia and 
imperialistic nationalism, it was still possible to terminate. As Smith (1998: 106) argues, by 
following the logic of contingency, Laclau and Mouffe evade ‘positivist prediction and 
theoretical meta-narratives’. By detecting the historical circumstances of political change, 
they are also sensitive to the actual limits of political practice at a given time. 
 
Once a particular political force becomes hegemonic, however, it might be able to prevail for 
some time. Hegemony reproduces our daily life; it starts to be hegemonic when our everyday 
understanding of social relations and the world as a whole starts to alter according to the 
framework that is set by the hegemonic discourse. It is quite a different act of power than 
those discussed in rationalist IR theory, for it makes the world intelligible: ‘The power of 
discourse to materialise its effects is thus consonant with the power of discourse to 
circumscribe the domain of intelligibility’ (Butler 1993: 187). In a final step, the discourse 
produces specific practices and institutions. It acquires material objectivity by becoming 
institutionally fixed. 
 
In a nutshell, hegemony is indispensable for the exercise of leadership. Both hegemony and 
leadership are essentially political; both rest on power, but not necessarily on the observable 
form of material power alone. Leadership must hence not be misunderstood as dominance or 
coercion. It is to Laclau’s merit to have reintroduced the term hegemony in contemporary 
debates concerning problems of political power and authority. Hegemony means nothing 
more than the discursive struggle between political actors over the assertion of their particular 
representations of the world as having a universal significance. Ultimately, it is only through 
hegemony that leadership can be established. 
 
 
2.4 Theoretical integration and empirical illustration 
 
The purpose of this section is to synthesise the concepts of power, leadership, and hegemony 
into one integrative model that makes it possible to study so-called (new) regional powers 
such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa from a process- and meaning-based perspective. 
Summarising the most significant arguments of the previous sections, an integrative approach 
has to fulfil the following criteria: Firstly, it has to take into account the conceptual difference 
between the mere capacity of possessing power and the actual transformation of power into 
leadership. Secondly, it needs to put the multifaceted relationship between leaders and 
followers in focus, which opens up a perspective on leadership as a social activity that often 
takes place in an institutionalised context, is issue specific, culturally embedded, contested, 
and rests on entrepreneurial skills to manage political coalitions. Finally, leadership must be 
seen as being co-constituted by hegemony, which implies the ability of a prospective leader to 
present his particular visions as universal, so that they become acceptable to relevant 
followers. Any hegemonic process can then be traced along the lines of the ideal-type model 
delineated in the previous section: (1) starting with a particular political crisis (of lesser or 
greater extent), (2) moving to the competition between different political forces to 
hegemonise the political field and (3) the acceptance of a certain interpretative framework of 
identification (actual hegemony), to (4) its eventual routinisation and political 
institutionalisation. As illustrated in fig. 1, this final act of institutionalisation causes feed-
back effects on the discursive representation of the crisis, new interpretative frames start to 
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compete, and politics continues. Theoretically, this circle never ends; if it did, politics would 
have reached its final purpose. Most significantly, however, it is possible to analyse different 
kinds of leadership processes on the basis of this framework. 
 


















In the East Asian case, which can be drawn on to illustrate the argument, it was the Asian 
financial crisis that triggered new complex correlations between power, leadership, and 
hegemony. In the years following the crisis, a dialectic and fundamentally contingent quest 
for leadership developed, mainly involving China and Japan, but also including some 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)6 and South Korea. Deeper 
integration and community building can be identified as the dominant interpretative 
framework used to overcome the predicament, with the institutionalisation of ASEAN+37 and 
the East Asia Summit (EAS)8 representing the institutional materialisation of the hegemonic 





The Asian crisis is widely considered as the primary source of a new Sino-Japanese struggle 
for leadership in the region (esp. Dent 2008a, 2008b). The resulting institutionalisation of the 
region was successful due to its linkage with an ongoing debate over the institutional shape of 
the region. The seeds for a genuine regional cooperation process combining both the 
Northeast and Southeast Asian subregions had already been sown by Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir in his proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) in the early 
1990s. Although the initiative was instantaneously torpedoed by non-East Asian countries 
(Low 1991), it lingered behind the scenes and was reinvigorated after the crisis (Nabers 2003). 
This finding offers preliminary, though still provisional support for a central theoretical 
argument outlined above: The ideal type cycle developed in the previous section emphasized 
that one predominant interpretation will evolve due to its linkages with residual institutions. 
Put differently, if the new political project clashes with the ‘ensemble of sedimented practices 
                                                 
6 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, 
Cambodia. 
7 The members of ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea. 









constituting the normative framework of a certain society’ (Laclau 2000a: 82; see also Laclau 
1990: 66), it will likely be rejected. 
 
A second argument put forward above refers to the normative dimension of leadership: 
Leadership is essential in politics in general, and in crises situations in particular. In the East 
Asia case, this argument has gained salience in the years after the crisis. It was through 
increasing competition between the old and the new economic powerhouses of East Asia that 
ideas of regionalism gained new momentum. While some observers argue that “China and 
Japan possess the most significant ‘regional leader actor’ capacity in East Asia” (Dent 2008b: 
3), these two countries also played a major role in the single stages of our theoretical model 
(interpretation of the crisis, competing interpretations, hegemony, institutionalisation). 
 
Although East Asian and Southeast Asian countries for the first time operated as a unified 
actor in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which was established in 1996, significant 
collaboration first evolved during the crisis. The domino effect of that financial quandary 
highlighted the "reality of the inter-connection of East-Asian's Economies" (Severino 1999). 
Interdependence and external shock are widely seen as the main trigger for alternative 
discourses on regional cooperation and region-building. The most prominent voices in this 
discourse emanated from Beijing and Tokyo,9 and in the years that followed, an intensive 
quest for leadership in different political fields started to develop. 
 
All in all, the financial crisis compelled many Asian countries to re-evaluate their place in the 
world. ‘The crisis has stimulated a new sense of East Asian regionalism and brought the 
countries closer together,’ says Tommy Koh, chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies in 
Singapore (quoted in Financial Times, 13 May 2001). Early one, Chinese president Jiang 
Zemin reassured neighbouring countries that his government would “adopt a positive attitude 
towards strengthening financial cooperation in Asia and [be] ready to participate in 
discussions on relevant mechanism for cooperation” and promised that certain “practical 
moves on our part will promote the development of economic and technological cooperation 
as well as trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region” (FMPRC 1997). 
Similarly, Japan announced it would play an active leadership role to counter the crisis.10 The 
starting signal was given for a quest for leadership in the region that turned out to be the 





It was argued above that, firstly, competing political forces will attempt to hegemonize the 
political space to exercise leadership, and, secondly, that leadership is always relational. 
Leaders have to please the motive bases of potential followers to be successful. Sticks and 
carrots play their part in such an endeavour, but they, too, are part of a discourse over the right 
                                                 
9 Tokyo’s interpretation of the crisis can be seen as exemplary in this context: “If we are lax in these 
efforts towards integration, we may invite more region-wide upheavels similar to the currency crisis. It 
is therefore important to understand how and in what sense this region, including Japan, is a community 
with common fate” (MOFA 1999). 
10 To quote foreign minister Obuchi: “As the largest economy in Asia, Japan feels a responsibility, despite 
its own very difficult situation, to do everything it can to help its East Asian friends through this time of 
economic trial. To date, we have contributed, both in international efforts led by IMF and in bilateral 
programs, a total of about 37 billion dollars -a sum that far exceeds the assistance from any extra-
regional country. We will continue to exercise the leadership to support the East Asian countries in 
cooperation with the international community. We also intend to tailor our efforts to address the needs 
of the region's less developed countries hit by the economic difficulties” (MOFA 1998). 
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political path to follow. Such a discourse started immediately with the outbreak of financial 
turmoil in East Asia in the Summer of 1997. At the height of the crisis, Japan came up with an 
initiative to set up an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), which was not realized, though, due to 
opposition from the West, especially the USA. But it was also immediately rejected by other 
Asian countries, most loudly by China. Contending that such an institution would be 
redundant given the presence of the IMF and that it would foster a split between Asia and 
North America, the proposal was buried for the time being (Kwan 2001: 11, 22-23, 127). 
However, Japan subsequently announced bilateral assistance plans such as the New 
Miyazawa Plan, worth $30 billion, and special yen loans, amounting to 650 billion yen (Japan 
Times, 14.7.2001). Consequently, ASEAN members seemed to uniformly appreciate 
assistance by the biggest economy, as can be seen from remarks by Ali Alatas, former Foreign 
Minister of Indonesia: 
 
I look forward to its [Japan’s] playing an important role in our common endeavours to soften the social 
impact of the financial and economic crisis upon our peoples, and eventually to overcome that crisis 
altogether (DFA Indonesia 1999). 
 
It becomes obvious that leadership is inseparable from the wants and needs of followers. 
Leadership is about giving and taking in specific situation, and different forms of power and 
leadership are required in different situations. Considering Japan’s economic stagnation 
during the 1990s, China has also been deemed more significant in generating regional 
economic growth. However, a widespread concern has persisted in Southeast Asia that 
investment flows into China may reduce those into the ASEAN states and that China will aim 
at expanding its leadership role in the region (for a critical discussion see Cheng 2004). As 
Alice Ba has pointed out, similar development paths do not automatically lead to a greater 
receptiveness to another’s message or even to the formation of a collective identity (Ba 2006: 
168). To reassure potentials followers, China time and again tried to downplay its economic 
size, emphasising the spirit of cooperation and mutual trust that ASEAN expects in its 
relations with Beijing. In his keynote speech to the Boao Forum in April 2002, Premier Zhu 
Rongji underlined that China’s growing economy posed no threat to Asia, and stressed that 
China was ready to work with its neighbours to build ‘a thriving new Asia’ (South China 
Morning Post, 13 April 2002). 
 
Subsequently, both China and Japan have tried to produce innovative proposals to overcome 
the financial predicament. In the first years after the crisis broke out, Japan quickly embraced 
a leadership role that included material incentives as well as vision and entrepreneurial skills 
(Nabers 2004; Terada 2004). By the turn of the century, Japan had contributed some 80 
billion US$ in financial aid to overcome the crisis (for an overview see MOFA 2000), while 
China has opted to intensify trade relations with ASEAN (Peng 2002). As an indication of the 
increasing readiness to accommodate the region materially, China in 2001offered ASEAN to 
open up its sensitive agricultural market. At the same time, China and ASEAN agreed to 
implement a free trade agreement by 2010, which encouraged Japan to come up with a 
broader plan for an East Asian FTA in 2002 (Gilson 2004). Mounting rivalry can be seen as a 
source for structural change in this context (Ravenhill 2008: 469). 
 
There are other examples of intense rivalry that can be quoted to underline the argument made 
here. The Mekong River region is one such instance (for China’s role see Goh 2006). While 
Beijing hoped that the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area would be supported by infrastructural 
links between China and the ASEAN states and indicated in November 2000 at the informal 
ASEAN+3 summit in Singapore that it would fund the construction of a Lancang-Mekong 
development project in Myanmar and Laos, Japan proposed two big projects for the countries 
in the region. One was supposed to facilitate the use of high-technology wireless tags to ease 
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trade, and the other is advancing know-how on electrical power development (Japan Times, 
27 September 2005). 
 
As a result of these numerous competing proposals, followership in East Asia also remained 
divided, with some countries following Japan, some other supporting China. For example, a 
Vietnamese government official commented that Japan’s vision of an Asian-wide FTA. 
seemed to be “all show and little substance” and that its main rationale was to counter the 
FTA idea floated by China to ASEAN (Business World, 27 February 2002). In contrast, some 
ASEAN members have underlined Japan’s continuing impact on Southeast Asian 
development. As Singapore’s Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo put it: 
 
Japan is ASEAN’s largest source of imports and our second largest export market. Japan is one of 
ASEAN’s largest sources of FDI. Southeast Asia can be Japan’s alternative manufacturing base to 
China. We have energy and other resources, which Japan needs. The benefits of an FTA between Japan 
and ASEAN would be of even greater benefit to South East Asia than an ASEAN–China FTA in the 
short and medium term (ASEAN 2002). 
 
Still, all these comments converge around the widespread acceptance of the idea of regional 
cooperation as the dominant interpretative framework after the crisis. It will be shown in the 




3) Dominant interpretation 
 
As posited by the ideal-type cycle developed above, one predominant interpretation often 
evolves – also due to its linkages with residual institutions – which institutes the framework 
that determines what action is appropriate and what action is inappropriate to end the 
quandary. In the East Asian case, two factors seem to be of particular importance in this 
regard: Firstly, a dominant view quickly evolved that existing institutions like ASEAN, APEC 
and the IMF would not be able to clean up the mess; secondly, and related to the widespread 
criticism of the IMF, countries in the region consented on the opinion that a regional solution 
was preferable to one that looked for help in the “West”. Hence, in the first phase of the 
institutionalisation process, political leaders in the region considered regionalism as a form of 
self-help mechanism in times of crises (Nabers 2003), and this dominant interpretation finally 
paved the way for the institutionalisation of the Asian idea. 
 
With regards to ASEAN, it looked as if the institution's self-esteem had already been low on 
the peak of the Asian crisis. It's expansion in the 1990s to include such economically weaker 
and democratically immature countries as Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had 
undermined consensus (Rüland 2000: 434-438; Kraft 2000: 454-457). And the new diversity 
had made political goals more difficult to accomplish. Singapore, a founding member of 
ASEAN, thus repeatedly spoke publicly of the need to "leapfrog" Southeast Asia to further 
economic growth and investment (International Herald Tribune, 26 July 2001). What is more, 
ASEAN, together with South Korea, had been the most seriously affected by the financial 
crisis. Particularly important was the effect on Indonesia, which had in the past provided 
much of the guidance in the group. Paralysed by the severeness of the economic turmoil, 
ASEAN contributed little to alleviating the crisis, which is commonly seen as diminishing 
greatly its value (e.g. Harris 2000). 
 
Concerning global institutions, critics have argued that the IMF's demand for taut monetary 
policy and structural reforms as a condition for its loans failed to restrain the crisis and 
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actually aggravated it.11 Summarizing the critique of the IMF during the Asian crisis for the 
Japanese government, 12  Tran Van Tho argues that the institution is generally unable to 
contribute to the strengthening of the supply side of the countries it supports, while its major 
task is stabilizing the macroeconomic environment. It can help by providing liquidity; yet, it 
fails when asked for support for real economic activities such as export financing or 
buttressing banks' lending capability. Moreover, the financial resources of the IMF are rather 
limited since it is an institution with global responsibilities. He concludes that: 
 
In a word, there is a need for a new institution that plays a role complementary to the IMF's. Such a 
framework cannot be established on a worldwide scale, though, because forming a consensus among a 
large number of countries will be difficult and require considerable time. In addition, crises are often a 
matter of regional concern, and it is perhaps only natural that deeply interdependent countries should 
help each other out (Japan Times, 14.7.2001). 
 
Many analysts agreed that the IMF reform measures were too abrupt and too harsh (e.g. Lewis 
1999). Furthermore, deeper analysis of documents released by East Asian governments show 
widespread and open criticism. While the Japanese government points out that the "crises in 
Russia and Brazil demonstrated the need to look at the risks inherent in the global financial 
system iteself" (MOFA 2001b: 2), the South Korean government directly addresses the need 
of "reforming the international financial architecture, and enhancing self-help and support 
mechanisms in East Asia through the ASEAN+3 framework" (MOFAT 1999: 1). Agreeing 
with this view, politicians such as the Japanese Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi and South 
Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil have from the beginning encouraged an alternative 
approach to bringing the crisis to an end, advocating that the IMF is incapable of treating 
poorly performing Asian economies. Instead of IMF-lead reforms, especially Miyazawa 
promoted an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as an alternative solution to the financial upheaval. 
 
The idea of a regional community featured prominently in the discourse and served as a 
dominant interpretative framework to overcome the financial turmoil. The idea was very well 
reflected in a statement by Thai Deputy Prime Minister Supachai: “We cannot rely on the 
World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or the International Monetary Fund but we must rely 
on regional cooperation” (quoted in The Nation, 10 June 2000). Others openly called for the 
leadership of Japan13 or China.14 These findings suggest that the community idea had been 
widely accepted by the countries in the region at the turn of the century. In other words: The 
dominant interpretative framework that was set by the community discourse had become 
hegemonic. It is an act of power because it makes the world intelligible: ‘The power of 
discourse to materialize its effects is thus consonant with the power of discourse to 
circumscribe the domain of intelligibility’ (Butler 1993: 187). In a final step, the discourse 
produces specific practices and institutions. It acquires material objectivity by becoming 
institutionally fixed. 
                                                 
11 For a critique see Business World, 26 May 2000. 
12 Tran Van Tho, who is professor in the School of Sciences in Tokyo's Waseda University, chaired the 
Japan Forum on International Relations Inc. in compiling the report "Economic Globalization and 
Options for Asia". 
13 As Singapore Prime Minister put it: ‘If we can find a way for Japan to feel confident and comfortable 
enough to have a free trade arrangement with China, then we can have an East Asian Free Trade Area 
which, of course, will the allow us to move toward and East Asian Economic Community’. Quoted in 
Terada 2004: 6. 
14 On the occasion of the China-ASEAN summit meeting in January 2007, Philippine President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo emphasised she expects China to take the lead in East Asia: “We also look to China 
to take the lead in promoting good neighborly relations and regional cooperation by handling sensitive 
issues with surrounding countries in a matter that is guided by the spirit of equality, respect, 






The proposals put forward by Japan, China and other countries in the region after the crisis 
led to the institutionalisation of the Asian idea within the framework of ASEAN+3, 
comprising the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus 
China, Japan and South Korea. ASEAN+3 has developed rapidly since the outbreak of the 
crisis, which is a hint at the validity of one of the central arguments of this article, that is, 
leadership requires an institutionalised context. As Chris Dent observes in his analysis of East 
Asian regionalism: “For there to be regional leadership, there must be some sort of coherent 
regional entity to lead” (Dent 2008b: 3). Through continuous and repetitive leadership, 
institutionalisation is further strengthened. Although neither China nor Japan were able to 
control the field of intelligibility in East Asia and among Asian governments completely, the 
community idea has gained considerable ground after the Asian crisis, with Sino-Japanese 
rivalry being its primary driving force. Institutionalised summitry can in this sense further 
reinforce leader-follower relationships. In the region, a process of steady institutionalization 
soon developed, including ministerial rounds, senior official meetings (SOM) and proposals 
to establish an East Asia Vision Group. It was in Hanoi in December 1998 where the heads of 
state or government of the ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea decided that 
regular meetings be held among them. The next summit meetings took place in Manila in 
November 1999 and in Singapore in November of the following year. Other meetings of the 
forum included those of the finance and foreign ministers of the 13 countries. 
 
The adoption of the so-called Chiang Mai initiative (CMI) in May 2000 set a framework for 
cooperation in the areas of capital-flow monitoring, self-help and support mechanisms, and 
international financial reforms15. The 13 countries involved in the process agreed to execute a 
series of currency swap arrangements between their central banks, consenting to lend each 
other part of their hard currency reserves if any of their currencies came under speculative 
pressure. As a result of the CMI, in May 2001 Japan announced bilateral deals with South 
Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. Together with the 1 Billion US$ announced by the ASEAN 
countries in November 2000, the mutual central bank support comprised more than 700 
Billion US$ in reserves. In July 2001, Japan and the Philippines reached a basic agreement to 
set up a 3 Billion US$-peso swap facility as part of the envisaged Asia-wide currency safety 
net (SCMP, 14 July 2001). 
 
The CMI was seen as a first step of monetary integration in East Asia, finally resulting in a 
monetary union (FEER, 12 July 2001). On that basis, long-term goal of a cooperative 
monetary regime in East Asia has repeatedly been outlined by Japan. In an interview in 
January 2000, Sakakibara Eisuke, former state secretary of the Japanese finance ministry, 
strongly advocated that kind of collaboration (World Bank, 12 January 2000). In line with the 
Japanese position, other Asian countries also encouraged expanded cooperation in social and 
cultural fields. As Malaysian Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade Rafidah Aziz sees it, 
integration in areas like youth, academic and media exchanges should begin right away. 
Building on further exchange in these fields, the minister says officials of the 13 participating 
countries can begin work on a customs compendium for the region (Asia Times online, 8 
March 2001; MOFA 2001a). Accordingly, politicians from China, Japan, and South Korea 
reached agreement at the Singapore summit in March 2001 to begin a study to examine the 
                                                 
15 See Henning (2002) for a comprehensive summary of the CMI. 
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feasibility of creating an East Asian economic community of the ASEAN plus three members 
(Ibid.). 
 
Between 2000 and 2009, China’s and Japan’s quest for leadership, underlined by repetitive 
innovative initiatives, remained the defining feature of East Asian international relations. 
Over the years, Beijing became diplomatically increasingly active. For instance, on the 
ASEAN+3 summit in Cebu in January 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made a five-point 
proposal to upgrade the level of regional cooperation, calling for the establishment of an 
Asian Bond Market, the initiation of a regional investment and credit guarantee mechanism, 
the improvement of the financing and investment environment in the region, strengthened 
cooperation in the public health sector and the enhancement of financial risk management. 
Moreover, Wen suggested that ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea advance security 
cooperation. Wen added that China will host a 10+3 symposium on corporate bond markets 
and a workshop on the participation of international disaster relief by the armed forces of 
participating countries. Finally, the premier also proposed that ASEAN, China, Japan and 
South Korea expand social and cultural cooperation: 
 
Poverty alleviation and women affairs are new areas for 10 plus Three cooperation. To share experience 
in poverty alleviation, promote regional poverty alleviation cooperation and discuss ways of enhancing 
women's role in promoting economic development and social progress, China will hold this year a 
training course for officials for poverty alleviation and another one on women affairs for 10 plus Three 
countries (MFAPRC 2007). 
 
In that sense, aspirations for leadership on both sides directly led to regional institutional 
change. The prime example for this mechanism is the multilateralisation of the CMI that was 
implemented in February 2009 and served as the core of the AMF that was boldly proposed 
by Japan in 1997. The 13 ASEAN+3 countries agreed that they would expand the regional 
currency swap arrangement to up to US$ 120 billion. While the size of the fund stood at 
US$ 80 billion before, China and Japan engaged in a contest over which country would offer 
more to enhance its liquidity. In an immense effort of symbolic value, both governments 
decided to pay an equal amount. Both Tokyo and Beijing contributed US$ 38.4 billion to the 
pool, while South Korea supplied another US$ 19.2 billion (BBC Monitoring Global 
Newsline Asia Pacific Economic file, 3 May 2009). This supports another theoretical claim 
made above: Leaders are coalition-builders; they rarely act alone. Subordinates are enlisted to 
fulfil certain roles in the leadership game; tasks are partly delegated. 
 
This brief overview served to exemplify some of the most significant features of power, 
leadership and hegemony: First, leadership (in contrast to power) is essentially related to the 
idea of community-building; it is relational and dependent on willing followership; leaders do 
not act alone. Secondly, solving problems in international politics entails leadership; this may 
involve translating relative power capabilities into bargaining leverage, but this is not 
necessarily so. Materially weaker states sometimes act as broker to gain support for salient 
solutions. Thirdly, leadership involves the continuous contestation over different 
representations that we call politics; it requires communication and social interaction, which 







This study has shown that leadership by powerful states in processes of regional 
institutionalisation is a significant, yet still ignored topic in the field of IR. Various theoretical 
strands have been discussed as to the requirements of effective leadership in international 
affairs. Referring to Steven Lukes (1974) three-dimensional view of power, it was argued that 
leadership is effective and sustainable when foreign elites acknowledge the leader’s vision of 
international order and internalise it as their own. Drawing on James MacGregor Burns’ 
(1978) work, leadership was differentiated from power. In contrast to power wielders, leaders 
might be able to get potential followers to see the world through their eyes in a hegemonic 
struggle. Moreover, leaders are effective as they induce change. Leadership, again in contrast 
to brute power, is inseparable from the wants and needs of followers, but these wants and 
needs may be changed through social interaction. 
 
Finally, analysing Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s political theory, the process of how 
to engage potential followers in the debating and contesting of ideas and of meanings was 
further investigated under the heading of discursive hegemony.16 On the basis of the empirical 
case that was introduced in the previous section, it can be concluded that the struggle over 
meaning is central to an understanding of leadership. Meaning has to be internalised in the 
intersubjective representations of other relevant actors. In East Asia, a strategy of ‘complex 
engagement’ (Ba 2006) of Southeast Asian countries forms the main pillar in China’s and 
Japan’s leadership strategies: this kind of engagement is in constant need of attracting 
potential followers, of interacting in different issue areas, of ‘argumentative persuasion’ 
(ibid.: 161) and its support by material incentives. 
 
In conclusion, hegemony-based leadership means nothing more than the discursive struggle 
between political actors over the assertion that their particular representations of the world 
have a universal significance. This is what leadership boils down to at the end of the day: The 
leader is the initiator, creator, and director in a struggle over meanings. It is the leader who 
makes communication and social interaction possible in the first place. While absolute power 
wielders tend to be objectified and dehumanised, leadership has to be seen as one of the 
essential and omnipresent features of social life in general and of international politics in 
particular. Of course, hegemony-based leadership is issue specific, culturally embedded, 
historically contingent, and never to be understood as a once-and-for-all decision. Once a 
particular political force becomes hegemonic, however, it might be able to prevail for some 
time. This allows us a view into the future of East Asian regionalism: It looks as if the 






ASEAN (2002) ASEAN’s Next Chapter, By George Yeo, http://www.aseansec.org/13136.htm 
[22 March 2007]. 
 
                                                 
16 Due to limited space, methodological issues are not addressed in this article. A possible path towards 
empirical research is offered by critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA is concerned with structural 
relationships of dominance, discrimination, social inequality and control as conveyed by language. It 
accepts the claim of an ultimate impossibility of fixing meanings by speech and recognizes the role of 
hegemony as a process of temporal fixation. However, it is also interested in unveiling the function of 
discourses which are used to generate and sustain unequal social power relations and can be identified 
as ideologies. See Fairclough 2003, for an overview. 
 20 
ASEAN (2003) Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN-Partnership in the 
New Millennium, Signed at the Summit in Tokyo, 12 December 2003 
http://www.aseansec.org/15500.htm [21 November 2008]. 
 
Aziz, Jahangir (2006) “Rebalancing China’s Economy: What Does Growth Theory Tell Us?”, 
IMF Working Paper 06/291. 
 
Ba, Alice D. (2006) ‘Who’s socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN 
engagement’, in: The Pacific Review 19,2, pp. 157-179. 
 
Batini, Nicoletta/Callen, Tim/McKibbin, Warwick (2006) ‘The Global Impact of 
Demographic Change’, IMF Working Paper 06/9. 
 
Berger, Thomas U. (1998) Cultures of Antimilitarism. National Security in Germany and 
Japan. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Burns, James MacGregor (1979) Leadership. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex". London/New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Butler, Judith (2000) ‘Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the limits of formalism’, in: 
Butler, Judith/Laclau, Ernesto/Žižek, Slavoy (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. 
Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London/New York: Verso, pp. 11-43. 
 
Butler, Judith/Laclau, Ernesto/Žižek, Slavoj (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. 
Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London/New York: Verso. 
 
Carr, Edward Haller (1964) The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. New York: Harper and 
Row. 
 
Cheng, Joseph Yu-shek (2004) ‘The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: genesis and 
implications’, Australian Journal of International Relations 58,2, pp. 257-277. 
 
Crawford, Neta C. (2002) Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, 
and Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Critchley, Simon (2004) ‘Is there a normative deficit in the theory of hegemony?’, Critchley, 
Simon/Marchart, Oliver (eds.) Laclau. A Critical Reader. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 
113-122. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. (1957) ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioral Science 2, pp. 201-215. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. (1961) Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New 
Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press. 
 
Dent, Christopher M., ed. (2008a) China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia. 
Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar. 
 
Dent, Christopher M., ed. (2008b) ‘What region to lead? Developments in East Asian 
regionalism and questions of regional leadership’, in: Dent 2008a, pp. 3-36. 
 21 
 
DFA Indonesia (Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia) (1999) Remarks by 
H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta, 28 January 
1999), http://www.dfa-deplu.go.id [10 September 2001]. 
 
Fairclough, Norman (2003) Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research. 
London/New York: Routledge. 
 
Finlayson, Alan/Valentine, Jeremy (2002) ‘Introduction’, Finlayson, Alan/Valentine, Jeremy 
(eds.) Politics and Poststructuralism. An Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, pp. 1-20. 
 
FMPRC (1997) Speech by President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China at the 5th 
APEC Informal Leadership Meeting, 1997/11/25, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24914.htm [10 June 2009]. 
 
Gehring, Thomas/Ruffing, Eva (2008) ‘When Arguments Prevail Over Power: The CITES 
Procedure for the Listing of Endangered Species’, in: Global Environmental Politics 8 (2), pp. 
123-148. 
 
Gilson, Julie (2004) ‘Complex regional multilateralism: ‘strategising’ Japan’s responses to 
Southeast Asia’, The Pacific Review 17 (1), pp. 71-94. 
 
Goh, Evelyn (2006) ‘Developing the Mekong: Regionalism and regional security in China-
Southeast Asian relations’, IISS: Adelphi Papers 46, 387. 
 
Guzzini, Stefano (2001) ‘The Different Worlds of Realism in International Relations’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 30 (1), pp. 111-121. 
 
Haas, Peter M./Haas, Ernst B. (2002) ‘Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of 
International Institutions’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 31 (3), pp. 573-601. 
 
Henning, C. Randall (2002) East Asian Financial Cooperation. Washington D.C.: Institute 
for International Economics. 
 
Hurrell, Andrew (2007) On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of 
International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ikenberry, G. John/Kupchan, Charles A. (1990) ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power,’ 
International Organization 44 (Summer), pp. 283-315. 
 
Joseph, Jonathan (2003) Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Jütersonke, Oliver (2006) ‘Morgenthau and the Return to Ethics in a Realist Theory of Power 
Politics’, Cooperation and Conflict 41 (4), pp. 463-469. 
 
Keohane, Nannerl O. (2005) ‘On Leadership’, Perspectives on Politics 3 (4), pp. 705-722. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. 
 22 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1989) ‘The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International 
Economic Regimes, 1967-1977,’ Keohane, Robert O. International Institutions and State 
Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 74-100. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (2001) Power and Interdependence. New York: 
Longman. 
 
Kraft, Herman Joseph S. (2000) ‘ASEAN and intra-ASEAN relations: weathering the storm?’, 
The Pacific Review 13,3, pp. 453-472. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1983) International Regimes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1985) Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John Gerard (1986) ‘International Organization: a state of 
the art on an art of the state’, International Organization 40, pp. 753-775. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto (1977) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, 
Populism. London: Verso. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto (1990) New Reflections of the Revolution of Our Time. London: Verso. 
 
Laclau (1996) Emancipation(s). London: Verso. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto (2000) ‘Identity and hegemony: The Role of universality in the constitution 
of political logics’, Butler, Judith/Laclau, Ernesto/ Žižek, Slavoy, Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso, pp. 44-89. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto (2005) On Populist Reason. London: Verso. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto/Mouffe, Chantal (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
 
Layne, Christopher (2006) ‘Impotent Power? Re-examining the nature of America’s 
hegemonic power’, The National Interest, 1 September 2006, 
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-5944253/Impotent-power-Re-examining-the.html 
[accessed 22 August 2008]. 
 
Lewis, J. (1999), ‘Asian vs. international: Structuring an Asian Monetary Fund’, Harvard 
Asian Quarterly, 3(4), http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/199904/9904a005.htm [15 
January 2002]. 
 
Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A. (1970) Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of 
Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
  
Liska, George F. (1962) Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press. 
 
Lukes, Steven (2005 [1974]) Power: A Radical View. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education. 
 23 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York/London: W.W. 
Norton. 
 
MFAPRC (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2007) Work in 
Partnership to Promote Win-win Cooperation, Address by Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State 
Council of The People's Republic of China at the Second East Asia Summit Cebu, the 
Philippines, 15 January 2007, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t290183.htm [6 March 
2007]. 
 
MOFA (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1998) Statement by Foreign Minister Keizo 
Obuchi on Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium, May 4, 1998, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/980504.html [9 June 2009]. 
 
MOFA (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2000) Asian Economic Crisis and Japan’s 
Contribution, October 2000, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html [10 
August 2007]. 
 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1967) Politics among Nations. 4th ed., New York: Knopf. 
 
Nabers, Dirk (2003) “The Social Construction of International Institutions: The Case of 
ASEAN+3”, in: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 1/2003, S. 111-134. 
 
Nabers, Dirk (2004) “ASEAN+3: The Failure of Global Governance and the Construction of 
Regional Institutions”, Schirm, Stefan A. (ed.): New Rules for Global Markets. Public and 
Private Governance in the World Economy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 215-234. 
 
Nabers, Dirk (2009) “Filling the void of meaning: Identity construction in U.S. foreign policy 
after September 11, 2001”, in: Foreign Policy Analysis 2/2009, pp. 191-214. 
 
Neustadt, Richard E. (1980) Presidential Power: The politics of leadership from FDR to 
Carter. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Norval, Aletta J. (1996) Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse. London: Verso. 
 
Norval, Aletta J. (2004) ‘Democratic decisions and the question of universality: Rethinking 
recent approaches’, Critchley, Simon/Marchart, Oliver (eds.) Laclau. A Critical Reader. 
London/New York: Routledge, pp. 140-166. 
 
Nye, Joseph (2008) The Powers to Lead. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Peng, Daijin (2002) ‘Invisible Linkages: A Regional Perspective of East Asian Political 
Economy’, International Studies Quarterly 46, pp. 423-447. 
 
Ravenhill, John (2008) ‘Fighting Irrelevance: an economic community ‘with ASEAN 
characteristics’’, The Pacific Review 21 (4), pp. 469-488. 
 
Risse, Thomas (2000) ‘Let’s argue! Persuasion and Deliberation in International Relations’, 
International Organization 54 (1) pp. 1-39. 
 
 24 
Rothacher, Albrecht (2005) “Germany and Japan as Newly Declining Powers”, in: Asia-
Europe Journal 3 (4), S. 551-560. 
 
Ruggie, John Gerard (1998) Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization. London/New York: Routledge. 
 
Rüland, Jürgen (2000) ‘ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical 
consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism’, The Pacific Review 13,3, pp. 421-451. 
 
Samuels, Richard J. (2003) Machiavelli’s children: Leaders and their legacies in Italy and 
Japan. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Schirm, Stefan (2009) ‘Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global 
Governance’, in: European Journal of International Relations, forthcoming. 
 
Schneider, Gerald (2005) ‘Capacity and Concessions: Bargaining Power in Multilateral 
Negotiations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33 (3), pp. 665-690. 
 
Severino, Rodolfo C. (1999) "An Emerging East Asian Community Reality or Mirage?" 
Keynote Address at the Regional Conference on Common Currency for East Asia: Dream or 
Reality, 5 August 1999, Penang. 
 
Sjöstedt, Gunnar (1999) ‘Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations: Crisis or Transition?’ 
Berton, Peter, Kimura, Hiroshi and Zartman, I. William (eds.) International Negotiation New 
York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 223-253. 
 
Smith, Anna Marie (1998) Laclau and Mouffe. The radical democratic imaginary. 
London/New York: Routledge. 
 
Strange, Susan (1983) ‘Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, in: Krasner 
(1983), pp. 337-354. 
 
Strange, Susan (1987) ‘The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony’, International Organization, 
Vol. 41, No. 4. (Autumn), pp. 551-574. 
 
Tallberg, Jonas (2006) Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Terada, Takashi (2004) ‘Thorny Progress in the Institutionalization of ASEAN+3: Deficient 
China-Japan Leadership and the ASEAN Divide for Regional Governance’, Keio University 
Policy and Governance Working Paper Series No. 49. 
 
Underdal, Arild (1994) ‘Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management’, 
Zartman, I. William (ed.) International Multilateral Negotiations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
pp. 178-197. 
 
Walt, Stephen M. (1987) The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
Walt, Stephen M. (1997) ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival 39 (1), pp. 156-176. 
 
 25 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley. 
 
Wendt, Alexander (1994) ‘Collective identity formation and the international state’, American 
Political Science Review 88, pp. 384-396. 
 
Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Wendt, Alexander (2003) ‘Why a World State is Inevitable’, European Journal of 
International Relations 9 (4), pp. 491-542. 
 
Wight, Colin (2006) Agents, Structures and International Relations. Politics as Ontology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Williams, Leonard (2007) ‘Abundance, lack, and identity’, Journal of Political Ideologies 
(June), pp. 109-126. 
 
Williams, Michael C. (2005) The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wodak, Ruth (1996) Disorders of Discourse. London: Longman. 
 
Wodak, Ruth (2001) ‘What CDA is about – a summary of its history, important concepts and 
its development’, Wodak, Ruth/Meyer, Michael (eds.) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. 
London: Sage, pp. 1-12. 
 
Wong, Benjamin (2000) ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Anti-Machiavellian Machiavellianism’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29 (2), pp. 389-409. 
 
Young, Oran R. (1991) ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of 
Institutions in International Society’, International Organization 45 (3), pp. 281-308. 
 
Zerilli, Linda M.G. (2004) ‘This universalism which is not one’, Critchley, Simon/Marchart, 
Oliver (eds.) Laclau. A Critical Reader. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 88-109. 
